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Abstract This paper outlines the development of a CGE model as a tool for analysing
many of the issues relating to the introduction of environmental taxation, such as interaction
with other taxes, revenue recycling, international carbon ‘leakage’ and tax export effects. The
model is linked to IIASA’s RAINS model to expand the analysis to cover other cross-
boundary pollution.
Analysis of a 30 ECU per tonne carbon tax applied in Germany, the UK and the rest of the
European Union indicate that it could achieve savings of the order of 20 per cent in carbon
emissions compared to business as usual, at little economic cost to the EU countries. The
emission savings may be slightly higher in Germany and lower in the UK than the rest of the
EU, while the latter would also gain more from terms of trade effects. The tax would bring
substantial savings in sulphur emissions. Alternatively, if emissions were allowed to stay
constant, the saving on abatement technology would mean a modest improvement in the net
cost of the tax. Effects on Nitrogen emissions are smaller.
*  University of Birmingham, UK.
**Professor of Economics and Econometrics, University of York.1
1 Introduction
At the Kyoto Conference in December 1997, the European Union (EU) agreed targets
for reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 8 per cent of 1990 levels by the year
2010. Despite some expected favourable developments in fuel use and efficiency,
overall expected economic growth means a cut is needed relative to “business as usual”
forecasts for 2010 of about 11 per cent growth in emissions (Lord Marshall’s Report to
the UK government, 1998). There is therefore a role for a taxation or marketable permit
policy to meet these goals. Such taxes/permits are bound to have effects on the terms of
trade and real incomes, and since they affect patterns of fuel use they will also have
effects on international pollution issues, such as the costs of acid rain pollution and its
abatement.
This paper summarises the adaptation of a large, static, multi-country computable general equilibrium
model (CGE) of the European Union, as set out in Fehr, Rosenberg and Wiegard (1995), henceforward
referred to as the FRW model, to analyse the issue of environmental taxation. Section 2 outlines
changes to the CGE model, to make it more suitable for energy analysis, as well as the development of
a link to the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)’s integrated environmental
assessment model RAINS (Regional Acidification Information and Simulation), which helps identify
the effects on other international pollutants. We believe this is the first time an integrated assessment
model has been given a general equilibrium dimension: such models take energy consumption data as
exogenously determined inputs, while GE models take as input more primitive variables such as
technology , tastes and policy. Section 3 then summarises some of the simulations carried out on these
models.
Reasons for a CGE approach.
Clarke et al (1996) discuss a variety of approaches to assess the likely costs of carbon
abatement. The use of CGE models reflects a recognition that the effects of an2
environmental tax reform can spread well beyond the energy sector. They also produce
a useful summary of the net effect in terms of standard measures of economic activity
(real GDP or GNP) and welfare (equivalent variation). While traditional
macroeconomic models may be useful in assessing transitional costs such as rates of
unemployment or inflation, CGE models may be more relevant in assessing the long-
term effects of action to combat global warming, since they allow for a greater degree
of microeconomic adjustment.
Depending on their setup, CGE models can deal with a number of important aspects:
(i) The interaction of a carbon tax with existing energy taxes and subsidies. If a tax shifts
demand away from subsidised industries, as Edwards (1998) found in the case of a
carbon tax on subsidised German coal, the overall cost of the tax is reduced, while if it
is applied to fuels already bearing high taxes and high profit mark-ups (see Clarke and
Edwards, 1998), the cost of the tax will be increased. While the model in this paper,
does not have the same detail of cross-subsidisation as in the above articles, it allows for
subsidies on fuel production and different specific and ad valorem taxes on different
fuels to different users.
(ii) Uses of the recycled tax revenue. There has been much comment on the possibility
that by using carbon tax revenues to cut taxes on labour, European countries could
actually gain a net economic benefit. However, studies using the general equilibrium
approach (sometimes even with non-clearing labour markets – e.g. Conrad and Schmidt
1998) have generally dampened the early optimism about this ‘double dividend’ (see
discussion in Boehringer, Pahlke and Rutherford, 1998), since in a general equilibrium
framework taxes on production or consumption ultimately raise the cost of consumer3
goods. This reduces the value of work time against leisure time, and so has similar
effects to an income tax in terms of deterring labour supply (see Bovenberg and de
Moji, 1994).
Where income taxes are highly progressive, transferring taxation from income to
consumption tends to encourage higher labour supply, though at the expense of
worsened income distribution (though only a few CGE studies, such as Pench, 1998,
actually look at distributional effects). If existing taxes are not progressive, there is only
a gain if the initial tax system is poorly designed.
For a detailed description of the FRW model, including details of algebraic derivations
and numerical solution, see Ruocco (1996). Duncan et al (1998) and Hutton and
Ruocco (1999) have used a modified version of the FRW incorporating different types
of labour supply and non-clearing labour markets to look at labour supply implications
of tax switches. However, such a detailed treatment of labour markets has been omitted
here, in order to allow for more detailed treatment of other aspects of the model.
Nevertheless, the version of the model outlined in this paper does contain a positive
labour supply elasticity, so the nature of revenue recycling will have important effects
on labour supply, output and welfare. An equation listing is shown in the Appendix.
The international dimension of the problem in Europe
Much environmental policy is now decided jointly by European Union (EU) member
states, which means that simulations based on action by a single country are not
realistic. In addition, the environmental policies of EU member countries have
substantial effects on their neighbours:4
(i) Carbon leakage. Attempts by one country to reduce carbon emissions can be offset
by shifts in production of carbon-intensive industries to other countries.  In practice, as
Boehringer, Rutherford and Voss (1997) find, leakages are only important in models
using the Ricardo-Viner approach, under which goods produced by a particular
production sector in different countries are perfect substitutes. Under the more common
Armington approach, where goods from different countries are treated as qualitatively
different, leakage effects are small. The Armington formulation is probably more
plausible given that production sectors are relatively aggregated (and hence exports
from one sector in different countries may consist of quite different commodities, such
as French wine and Irish beef), and also given that there is considerable two-way trade
within sectors in our database (something not consistent with the Heckscher-
Ohlin/Ricardo-Viner assumptions 
1.
(ii) Tax export (Markusen, 1975). Effects on world fuel prices, or on real exchange rates
may mean that some of the cost of a carbon tax is borne by countries other than those
imposing the tax. Global or North-South models (e.g. Whalley and Wigle (1991)), have
looked at these effects in some detail. The terms of trade effect, where an energy-
importing country imposing a carbon tax sees a reduction in its import bill and
consequent rise in its exchange rate, has been large enough in some single-country
studies - e.g. Germany in Edwards (1998), or Italy in Pench (1998) - to outweigh other
effects and actually cause a rise in real incomes in the country imposing the tax, at least
                                                       
1For more detailed discussion see Vocke (1998 forthcoming). The Armington
assumption, where different countries’ shares in demand for a particular good depend
only on relative prices, is perhaps best seen as an approximation to deal with the many
reasons why goods from different countries are imperfect substitutes. The formulation
may not be the most appropriate in some cases (e.g. where economies of scale to the5
for modest tax rates. Given that Germany and Italy both trade largely with their
European neighbours, a multi-country model of Europe would seem a very appropriate
way of assessing these effects further.
Many CGE studies have used models that rule out sizeable terms of trade effects: for
example Boehringer et al’s (1998) model of Germany, while using an Armington trade
model, has fixed import and export prices
2.  In Conrad and Schmidt’s 1998 European
multi-country study, prices for Europe’s trade with the rest of the World are fixed, so
potential tax export effects to the rest of the World are effectively ruled out.  By contrast
in the FRW model all countries produce differentiated products, and while the trade
effects are largest between European neighbours, which trade a great deal with one
another, the rest of the World’s import and export prices can also be affected by
demand changes.
(iii) International pollution. Edwards (1998) finds sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions
change by a very similar proportion to CO2 in response to a carbon tax in both Japan
and Germany (both pollutants being emitted in similar proportions from the main fossil
fuels), while nitrogen oxides/ozone (NOx) are less affected by a carbon tax, and
particulates are affected a good deal in Japan but less in Germany. Valuations based on
estimates of health and environmental gains from savings in this pollution can be quite
substantial relative to the other costs and benefits involved in carbon abatement (see
Clarke and Edwards, 1997).
                                                                                                                                                              
firm are at the root of the imperfect substitution).
2In Boehringer et al’s model, imports, whose price is fixed, are an imperfect substitute
for German produce, while, for  German producers, exporting (at a fixed world price)
is an imperfect substitute for sales to the home market. Hence imports and exports
will change as a tax is introduced, but Germany’s terms of trade are unaffected.6
Much of the cost of changes in pollution will be borne abroad. The costs of CO2
emissions are worldwide, while those of SO2 and NOx are spread regionally across
Europe.  Particulates tend to be more local, though with some international spread.
Alternatively, if the country imposing a carbon tax has agreed to limit its emissions of
these other pollutants to fixed target levels, the consumption of less polluting fuels can
bring a saving in terms of less need to install abatement technology. In this case the
saving is internalised. Conrad and Schmidt look at the latter possibility for SO2 and
NOx, with rather simplified abatement cost curves.
2 Structure of the model and database
This study runs a multi-country CGE model of the European Union, developed from the
FRW model, in conjunction with the RAINS model of transboundary SO2 and NOx
pollution and abatement costs.
For an energy/environmental study it was necessary to alter the disaggregation of the
FRW database. In addition, there is an extra stage of the production function to allow
for aggregation of energy and other goods. The indirect taxation structure is more
sophisticated, but unlike the FRW original, government spending is not differentiated
from household consumption. Aspects of the modelling that are altered from the
original FRW model are marked with asterisks**.
There are four regions in the model: the UK, Germany, the rest of the (12 member
1992) EU and the rest of the world (ROW). There are 3 non-energy and 9 energy
sectors.  The latter are highly aggregated to allow for a more detailed disaggregation
of energy. Output can be sold as an input to other sectors or to consumers at home or7
abroad. Consumers are an aggregate of households, government and various non-
profit-making bodies. All sectors are perfectly competitive. Of the two factors of
production, labour is mobile between sectors but not between countries, while capital
can move freely around the world. As a result there is a single global cost of capital,
while wages vary between countries.
Data Sources
Starting from Fehr’s (1996) data set for 1992, it was necessary to disaggregate energy
from an energy and water sector. For this reason, for European energy sectors we have
used data from the International Energy Agency’s Energy Statistics of OECD Countries
and Energy Prices and Taxes. Average prices for the Rest of the EU were approximated
by average of French and Italian prices. Accuracy of data for the Rest of the World
(ROW) is not so important for this study. Energy production and use tables for ROW
were based on Table A10 of the 1992 World Bank World Development Report, with
prices and taxes assumed to be somewhat lower than in the EU. Trade volumes were
derived from the total import and export figures by area.
The non-energy sectors have been highly aggregated from the original FRW model,
into an energy-intensive sector (chemicals, steel and paper, pulp and printing), an
agriculture, services and transport sector (no separate transport data was available in the
FRW database), and an other industry sector.
Production function.8
The basis of the model is a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function, with goods in the same stage of nesting being closer substitutes for one
another.
(i) Imports from different countries are combined to form a single composite imported
input. (ii) The composite imported input is combined with home-produced inputs.
(iii)** Inputs are aggregated to form composite inputs of energy, non-energy materials
and value added. (iv)** Energy, materials and value added are combined to form total
output.
Consumer Sector and labour supply
For final consumption, again nested CES functions are exploited. The stages are:
(i) Merge imports of each commodity from different countries as a ces aggregate.
(ii) Combine the aggregate import with the home-produced version of the same good.
(iii) Aggregate the various consumer goods, to form aggregate consumption.
(iv) Disposable income is spent entirely on the aggregate consumer good. Household
utility is a CES aggregate of consumption and leisure.
The government sector
Unlike the FRW model**, government spending is simply treated as a transfer to
households. Taxes comprise the following. (1) On production: (i) A production
tax/subsidy per unit of output and (ii)** Specific taxes per unit volume on inputs of
energy into another industry. (2) On trade, import tariffs between the EU and non-EU
countries. (3) On consumption  (i) Specific taxes** and (ii) Value added taxes with
variable rates across goods. (4) Income tax applies to both labour and capital income of9
a single representative household, with  ‘representative marginal income tax rates’
derived from Hutton and Ruocco (1999).
International Trade
Trade is modelled using the “Armington specification”, in which all countries produce
differentiated goods. The household and government balances are fixed at zero, which
implicitly fixes the balance of payments (trade plus long-term capital) at zero too. All
elasticity assumptions are given in the Appendix Table 1.
Modelling energy consumption and carbon emissions.
The carbon calculations are basically derived from consumption of primary fossil fuels,
for which the following carbon content figures are used (tonnes carbon per tonne of oil
equivalent):
Hard coal     1.12 tC/toe
Soft coal      1.37 tC/toe
Crude oil 1   0.84 tC/toe
Natural gas   0.64 tC/toe
The carbon content of use of secondary fossil fuels is based upon the carbon from
primary fossil fuels used in their calculation. Where the secondary fuel is an import, we
use the total carbon content of primary fossil fuels used in the production of the
secondary fuel.
The Carbon Tax is applied in ECU per tonne carbon to all primary fuels according to
their initial (base case) carbon content, and to all imported secondary fossil fuels, if their10
country of origin is not also applying a carbon tax. No tax is applied to imported
electricity.
Link to the IIASA RAINS model of sulphur and nitrogen emissions and deposition.
RAINS, developed by IIASA (see Alcamo et al, 1990, Klaassen, 1996, Bertok et al
1993), is the most widely used model of emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen
oxides (NOx), and of their deposition and abatement costs. The model has sulphur and
nitrogen modules, each of which uses scenarios combining an energy pathway (a set of
projected demands by fuel, country and sector, for 5 year intervals) with an abatement
scenario (based only on technological measures). For our work, the output from the CGE
model, showing the effects of a carbon tax on fuel use, is used as the basis for a revised
energy pathway. We are interested in the consequential geographical distribution of the
two pollutants, SO2 and NOx.
Combining the two models raises a number of complications. RAINS is a scenario
model for a series of 5 year snapshots into the future, while the CGE solves for the
energy economy in a single base year for alternative tax policies. We have therefore
concentrated on looking at one year only in the RAINS pathways, 1995, which is
reasonably close to the 1992 base for the CGE model, and using that as the base case for
simulations. In addition, RAINS uses a greater disaggregation of fuels and sectors than
the CGE model, with categories not agreeing exactly, so to apply the changes compared
to base we have had to make assumptions as to which fuels and sectors in the CGE
correspond to which in RAINS.11
RAINS is also more disaggregated in terms of countries. The CGE ‘Other EU12’
grouping is split down into 10 individual member states for RAINS. The non-EU
countries of Europe are all covered separately in RAINS, but form just part of the
‘ROW’ grouping in the RAINS model.
The base case shares of different fuels within a sector vary greatly between different
member countries of Other EU12 and ROW. This can cause unrealistic effects (e.g. if oil
is substituted for coal across the other EU12 group as a whole, countries which are oil-
intensive may see fuel use rise in response to a tax, while countries which are coal-
intensive will see it fall). This effect is reduced by alternately rescaling energy use by
country and by sector.
3  Some carbon tax simulations
Appendix Table 2 shows some key statistics of our database in the base year 1992. The
total EU accounts for 13.3 per cent of global carbon emissions. Of EU members, the
UK and Germany, which are relatively more coal-dependent, produce 20 and 30 per
cent respectively. The UK imports a very small fraction of its fuel. Germany imports
about 2/3 of its primary energy needs, while the rest of the EU is almost totally
dependent on imports. As a result, the terms of trade effect of a carbon tax is much
more marked in the Other EU12 countries than in Germany or, particularly, the UK.
For simulation purposes, the chosen level of carbon tax is 30 ECU per tonne carbon
(1992 prices). Appendix Table 2B calculates the average expenditure by all final users
on energy, relative to the total carbon emissions of the country concerned. As can be
seen, a 30 ECU/tonne tax is modest compared to 450-800 ECU expenditure per tonne12
carbon across the EU. But prices of some fuels to some sectors (e.g. of coal to power
generation) will rise much more sharply.
A final comment on what to expect in this type of modelling exercise is in order: long-
term CGE models tend to produce lower estimates for the costs of environmental taxes
than shorter-run macroeconomic studies, since they allow more flexibility at a
microeconomic level for the economy to adapt to the tax. For a carbon tax to produce a
‘large’ economic loss requires either a very high rate of tax, or that the tax compounds
existing distortions in the economy.
Basic Simulations of a carbon tax (Appendix Table 3)
This study considers four scenarios: where carbon taxes are imposed in the UK alone, in
Germany alone, in the rest of the EU-12 and across the EU. It is assumed the revenue is
recycled as lower value added tax, which would have less of a labour market effect than
recycling as income tax, but should be more equitable in terms of income distribution
(which we cannot analyse, but see Barker and Kohler (1998)). This paper is not
intended specifically to investigate a ‘double-dividend’ effect of reducing labour taxes,
although as all taxes in this model affect the work decision, labour market effects mean
that the efficiency effects of changes in the incidence of indirect taxes are amplified.
Column A shows the effects of a 30 ECU carbon tax in the UK. Perhaps surprisingly
the carbon tax at 30 ECU/tC has no net cost to GNP.  This reflects partly the fact that in
our base year domestic energy in the UK was exempt from VAT, so the carbon tax is
actually serving up to a point to equalise tax rates across different commodities. Also,
the carbon tax reduces energy imports, which, given the Armington trade assumptions
in the model, this allows a rise in the real exchange rate, improving Britain’s terms of13
trade by 0.45 per cent. As a result, much of the cost of the tax that one might expect to
be borne in the UK is actually felt abroad (if 20 % of the UK’s GNP is imported, the
terms of trade gain to the UK would be 0.09 per cent of GNP). The effect on the rest of
Europe and the World is a small reduction in real incomes.
Offsetting the terms of trade gain, real wages fall marginally, which deters labour,
despite the cut in VAT. However, the reduced labour supply means that welfare in the
UK including leisure is fractionally raised by the tax change.
Interestingly, carbon emissions outside the UK also fall slightly, so there is no ‘leakage’
problem for a carbon reduction policy in this model. This is partly the tax slightly
reduces incomes abroad. Also, secondary energy (refined oil and electricity) export
prices from the UK are raised by a carbon tax, which raises energy prices in the rest of
Europe slightly.
In Column B the tax is introduced in Germany only. Since Germany, particularly the
Eastern Laender, consumes a lot of highly polluting soft coal in its power generation
sector, there is more scope than in the UK for low-cost fuel switching. As a result a
similar tax rate produces slightly larger proportionate reductions in carbon emissions:
nearly 20 ½ per cent. However, as this means the substitution of imported oil and gas
for home-produced soft coal, the effect of the carbon tax on the terms of trade is
actually slightly less than in the UK, with an improvement of 0.37 per cent. Also, since
Germany already has substantial VAT on domestic fuel, the carbon tax does not offset
an existing distortion there, and so the cost effects on GNP and welfare are rather higher
than in the UK.  GNP is reduced by 0.06 per cent, though since this is partly due to a14
drop in labour input due to lower real wages, the net effect on welfare including leisure
is rather less than this.
A tax of 30 ECU in Germany produces slight increases in carbon emissions elsewhere,
as production of energy-intensive industries shifts to the rest of the EU and to the Rest
of the World (presumably Central and Eastern Europe).
Column C shows the effect of a 30 ECU tax in the EU excluding Germany and the
UK. Because this is a heterogeneous grouping of countries, and oil or nuclear fuel
inputs in one may not easily substitute for coal in another, the fuel substitution
elasticities for the ‘Other EU’ countries have been reduced by 3/8 compared to the UK
and Germany. The overall effect is for the 30 ECU/tC tax to reduce carbon emissions
by 20 per cent: less than with a similar tax in Germany, but more than in the UK. The
terms of trade effect, however, is greater (a rise of nearly 0.9 per cent), and this
contributes to a rise in real wages, real GNP and welfare.  The tax export effect means
that incomes in the UK, Germany and the Rest of the World are reduced somewhat.
 Column 4 shows the effects of a tax across the EU. The effect of the tax on emissions
in the UK, Germany and rest of the EU is marginally greater than when the countries
introduce the tax individually. The tax still has more effect proportionally in Germany,
and less in the UK, than in the rest of the EU.
Since European countries trade with one another, the terms of trade gain to the countries
introducing the tax is less than when they do so individually. Consequently, GNP in the
UK and Germany falls slightly instead of rising, though that in the rest of the EU still15
rises a little. There is a significant export of the costs of the European tax to the rest of
the World, where real GDP is reduced by 0.04 %.
Implications for other pollutants
Tables 4A and 4B show the implications of scenario 4 (the 30 ECU/tC tax across the
EU 12) in 1995 for SO2 and NOx emissions respectively. These assume no change in
the application of abatement technology, so that the reduced fuel use and switch to
cleaner oil and gas away from coal reduce SO2 and NOx emissions. For SO2 (Table
4A) the carbon tax has a large effect in Germany, where emissions are reduced by
more than a third, due to the replacement of dirty brown coal use (particularly in the
Eastern Laender) in power generation. Spain, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands,
which all rely on dirty coal-fired generation also see large improvements. The effects
are much less in the UK, where the main coal-fired power stations already had
abatement technology fitted, and improvement is about 10 per cent, or Italy, where
generation is largely oil-fired. The overall reduction in emissions in the EU 12 was 23
per cent, but half of European emissions in the base case come from outside the EU
(particularly Poland and the Czech Republic) where the EU carbon tax has little effect
on emissions.
NOx emissions (Table 4b) are more linked to oil consumption, especially in transport,
and are less affected by a carbon tax. The reduction in the UK is just 4 per cent, while
emissions in Germany are reduced by 7.86 per cent, and the other EU 12 (except
Ireland and Luxembourg) see reductions in the range 4 to 10 ½ per cent.16
Tables 5A and 5B from the deposition module of the RAINS model show that the
benefit of lower sulphur emissions across the EU in terms of lower excess deposition
(above the critical threshold where acid starts to build up) are concentrated largely in
Germany, with Sweden and Poland also benefiting substantially, but much of the EU
seeing much smaller effects. The reduction in excess deposition of nitrogen in acid
rain is more evenly spread, with France the largest beneficiary, followed by the
Scandinavian countries, Germany and Belgium.
As an alternative, countries might decide instead to maintain emission levels at the same
level as without the carbon tax, spending less on abatement technology. This would
produce an internal benefit to the country imposing the tax. In the case of the UK,
RAINS suggests the saving in 1995 from lower costs of sulphur abatement (if the tax
had been in place) would have been ECU 85 bn (1990 prices), or about 0.01 per cent of
GDP. The UK saving on NOx abatement would have been just ECU 5 bn, though as the
cost function for NOx abatement is highly nonlinear, in later years, when more
abatement technology is expected to be applied, the marginal costs of abating NOx (and
hence the value of reducing emissions by other means, such as a carbon tax) will be
higher.
In Germany, the reduction in sulphur emissions in 1995 if the carbon tax had been
imposed is greater than the total effects of technological abatement in place at that date.
4 Conclusions
This paper has shown how a static, multi-country CGE model can be used to analyse
the economic effects of carbon abatement policy, taking account of international
effects. It has also established a link with the RAINS model of acid rain depletion,17
which shows that there is a strong connection between carbon and sulphur emissions,
and a weaker one with nitrogen emissions.
The model assesses a 30 ECU per tonne carbon tax. When this is applied across the 12
countries which were EU members in our base year (1992), the saving in carbon
emissions is around 20 per cent compared with base: this is rather larger than the EU
would need to achieve (compared with business as usual) in 2010, but such a saving
might well be required in future commitments. Tax export effects, mean the cost of
the carbon tax when applied across the EU is 0.12 % of GNP in the UK and 0.04 % in
Germany, with a small gain in GNP in other EU countries, where the terms of trade
benefit from taxing energy imports is greater. When countries such as the UK or
Germany undertake a carbon tax on their own, the terms of trade benefit to them is
greater than when EU members act in concert, and their GNP is barely affected by a
tax of 30 ECU/tC.
Abatement of sulphur provides a further benefit of a carbon tax, as the encouragement
to fuel saving and switching towards cleaner fuels means either lower emissions or
alternatively, that countries need spend less on cleaning up technology. If emissions
of sulphur fall, the main beneficiary would probably be Germany. In the event of
countries instead choosing to keep emissions constant but spending less on abatement
technology, the benefits would be more widespread. The UK would gain about an
extra 0.01 % of GDP.18
The effect on NOx emissions is a smaller reduction. The benefits of this are more
widespread across the EU, but the reduction, at least in the early years, could be




(i) Between imported intermediates from different countries: SIG4 = 2
(ii) Between imported and non-imported intermediates: SIG3 = 2
(iii) Between capital and labour: SIG2 = 0.8
(iv) Between fuels: SIGEN = 2 for UK or Germany. 1.25 for Other EU12 or ROW.
Except in power generation SIGEN = 4 for UK/Germany and 2.5 for Other EU12/ROW.
or in ag/comm (which includes transport) SIGEN = 0.8 for UK/Germany or 0.5 for Other EU12/ROW.
(V) Between non-fossil fuels: SIGNONF = 0.5
(vi) Top level between energy, non-energy and value added:
SIGMATOP = 0.5
Consumption Function:
(i) Between imports from different source countries: SIGMA3 = 2
(ii) Between composite imports and home-produced goods: SIGMA2 = 2
(iii) Between different consumption goods: SIGMA1 = 0.5
Labour Supply:
Uncompensated labour supply elasticity: ELLSUP = 0.1520
Table 2: Energy Statistics from the database.
A: Some key statistics of our database for the economies in the base year 1992 :                                     
GNP             Energy Consumption MTOE         Carbon Dioxide
                                                           Final            Primary                       MT Carbon
UK                                0.91               144.5           192.4                    160.0   (2.6%)
Germany                       1.44             229.8           278.6            257.6   (4.1%)
Rest of EU 12              3.53                             541.6           538.2                              412.9   (6.6%)
Total EU                      5.88                 915.9         1009.2               830.5   (13.3%)
Rest of the World       17.00                           4915.6        6341.0                          5412.6  (86.7%)
Global total                 22.88                           5831.5        7350.2                          6243.1 (100%)
B:Energy price  per unit carbon
(a) (b) (a)/(b)
   Expenditure by M Tonnes            Final
final energy usersCarbon Expenditure
                                                        ECU mn                emitted    per tC
UK    72204  160 451
Germany  123579  258 479
Rest of EU                                        333183                413                     807
Total EU  528966  831   637
Rest of the World                            1727291               5412                    319
Global Total 2256257 6243 361
C:Net energy export/imports
(a) (b) (a)/(b)
Net exports Primary Consumption              Net exports share
                                                        MTOE                 MTOE                                             
UK      -4.9  192.4    -2. 5 %
Germany   -186.7  278.6   -67. 0 %
Rest of EU                                        - 486.1                 538.2                                   -90. 3 %
Total EU   - 677.7 1009.2   -67.2  %
Rest of the World    677.7 6741.0    +10.1 %21
Table 3. 
European Multi-country CGE model: Simulations of the effects of
a 30 ECU per tonne carbon tax compared to base.  
30 ECU/tC tax applied in:
UK        GERMANY        OTHER     ALL
COUNTRY: ONLY   ONLY                 EU 12         EU
UNITED
KINGDOM CO2 emissions -17.15%  0.07%   0.18%  -17.54%
primary energy cons -15.52%  0.04%   0.37%  -15.55%
real wage -0.02% -0.01% -0.06%    -0.07%
real GNP  0.00% -0.01% -0.04%     -0.04%
welfare (eq varn)  0.01% -0.01% -0.03%   -0.04%
terms of trade            100.45% 99.95% 99.82% 100.22%
GERMANY CO2 emissions 0.28% -20.44%              -0.68% -21.07%
primary energy cons 0.45% -16.33%  0.62% -15.99%
real wage              -0.01% -0.17% -0.04% -0.22%
real GNP 0.00% -0.06% -0.05% -0.12%
welfare (eq varn) 0.00% -0.04% -0.04% -0.10%
terms of trade             99.99%  100.37% 99.79% 100.10%
OTHER
EU CO2 emissions -0.67% -0.09% -20.10%-20.23%
primary energy cons -0.23% 0.08% -18.14%-17.85%
real wage -0.02% -0.01%    0.10%    0.11%
real GNP -0.01% -0.02%    0.03%   0.02%
welfare (eq varn) -0.01% -0.01%    0.03%   0.01%
terms of trade 99.96% 99.90% 100.89%100.74%
REST OF
WORLD CO2 emissions -0.03% 0.00% -0.17% -0.20%
primary energy cons -0.03% 0.00%    0.01%  0.00%
real wage -0.09% 0.00% -0.06% -0.06%
real GNP -0.05% -0.01% -0.03% -0.04%
welfare (eq varn) -0.04% 0.00% -0.02% -0.03%
terms of trade 99.90% 99.86% 99.32% 99.12%
CARBON EMISSIONS
Change MTC 
UK -27.44 0.11 0.28 -28.05
Germany  0.72   -52.67              -1.76 -54.28
Other EU -2.75    -0.38            -82.98 -83.54
Total EU -29.47 -52.93            -84.46     -165.87
Rest of World -1.66     0.14 -9.11 -10.96
Global -31.14 -52.79 -93.58 -176.84
Leakage(+)/extl savgs(-) -3.70    -0.13 -10.59 -10.9622
Table 4 A.
Sulphur emissions: change on 1995 base assuming EU 12 impose 30 ECU/t carbon tax.
Change in sulphur emissions based on 1995 energy use and second sulphur protocol controls
Base kT Change kT Change
per cent
REGION 1: UK 2395.4 -237.37 -9.91%
REGION 2: GERMANY 4705.62 -1580.1 -33.58%
REGION 3: OTHER EU12 6390.9 -1330.17 -20.81%
Italy 2089.12 -235.88 -11.29%
Spain 1838.06 -643.38 -35.00%
France 883.43 -122.17 -13.83%
Greece 426.95 -96.85 -22.68%
Belgium 344.56 -47.43 -13.77%
Netherlands 232.33 -61.39 -26.42%
Denmark 224.58 -66.22 -29.49%
Portugal 218.86 -21.12   -9.65%
Ireland 123.49 -35.73 -28.93%
Luxembourg    9.52    0    0.00%
TOTAL EU 12           13491.92 -3147.64 -23.33%
REGION 4: REST OF EUROPE 14054.93   17.5   0.12%
Poland 2572.35    6.51   0.25%
Russia 2341.69   -1.01 -0.04%
Ukraine 1711.35   -0.14 -0.01%
Czech 1428.67    3.26   0.23%
Bulgaria 1350.08    5.6   0.41%
Romania 922.05    2.48   0.27%
Hungary 804.52    0.94   0.12%
Others 2924.22 - 0.14   0.00%
SEAS 575.89    0   0.00%
TOTAL EUROPEAN  28122.74 -3130.14 -11.13%
EMISSIONS23
Table 4 B
NOx emissions: change on 1995 base assuming EU 12 impose 30 ECU/t carbon tax.
Change in NOX emissions based on 1995 energy use and current controls
Base kT Change kT Change
per cent
REGION 1: UK 1186.06 -48.13 -4.06%
REGION 2: GERMANY 1107.4 -87.09 -7.86%
REGION 3: OTHER EU12 3752.27              -240.02 -6.40%
Italy 1225.84 -58.46 -4.77%
Spain  768.75 -66.06 -8.59%
France  706.34 -28.37 -4.02%
Greece  265.72 -15.47 -5.82%
Belgium  190.12   -9.55 -5.02%
Netherlands  232.39 -19.4 -8.35%
Denmark  139.06 -14.52 -10.44%
Portugal  153.27 -16.08 -10.49%
Ireland    61.2 -12.05 -19.69%
Luxembourg     9.58   -0.06  -0.63%
TOTAL EU 12 6045.73             -375.24 -6.21%
REGION 4: REST OF EUROPE 6853.82   6.18 0.09%
Poland   675.66    1 0.15%
Russia 2328.27   2.08 0.09%
Ukraine 1256.49   1.47 0.12%
Czech   213.97   0.16 0.07%
Bulgaria   221   0.13 0.06%
Romania  422.86   0.5 0.12%
Hungary  163.13   0.07 0.04%
Others 1572.44   0.77 0.05%
SEAS  635.74  0 0.00%
TOTAL EUROPEAN  13535.29           -369.06              -2.73%
EMISSIONS24
Table 5a
RAINS model sulphur excess deposition (5% level) change from a 30 ECU carbon tax 1995 
Excess deposition
Ecosystem  No carbon carbon Change Change
area  tax                tax x area
UK 7890    645.5   633.9    -11.6     91524
Germany 8693  1687.9 1341.2  -346.7 3013863.1
Belgium   621  1678.8 1441  -237.8   147673.8
Denmark    974    312 197.1  -114.9   111912.6
France              14483   118.4 88.9    -29.5   427248.5
Greece 2455       0   0       0             0
Ireland   489     32.6 30.5     -2.1       1026.9
Italy 6627   381.7             339.7    -42   278334
Luxembourg     88 1231.1           1053.9 -177.2     15593.6
Netherlands   320 1999.1           1699.4 -299.7     95904
Portugal 2829      0  0      0             0
Spain 8523    42.5              22.6  -19.9   169607.7
Austria 4872 1207.5           1081.6 -125.9   613384.8
Finland              32208     81.3 71.2   -10.1   325300.8
Sweden              43650   204.9             172.5   -32.4 1414260
Norway             32065   153.2             135.8   -17.4   557931
Switzerland         1189   810.4             701.8 -108.6   129125.4
Czech              2656 1966.8           1654.8  -312   828672
Estonia              1891    55.5               44.7  -10.8     20422.8
Hungary             1670  226.3             212.5  -13.8     23046
Poland              6372               1641.7           1392.1 -249.6 1590451.2
Slovenia  906  905             874.3  -30.7  27814.225
Table 5B
RAINS model nitrogen excess deposition (5% level) change from a 30 ECU carbon tax 1995 
Excess deposition
Ecosystem  No carbon carbon Change Change
area tax tax x  area
UK 7890   440.1   433.3     -6.8    53652
Germany 8693   819.3   801.5   -17.8  154735.4
Belgium   621 1082.1 1055.8   -26.3    16332.3
Denmark   974   315.5   196.4 -119.1  116003.4
France              14483     93.1     71.7  -21.4  309936.2
Greece 2455       0       0      0            0
Ireland   489     22.6     22.2     -0.4        195.6
Italy 6627   268   262.6      -5.4    35785.8
Luxembourg     88   750   732.5   -17.5      1540
Netherlands   320 1837.2 1813.8   -23.4      7488
Portugal 2829       0       0      0            0
Spain 8523       0.2       0.1     -0.1        852.3
Austria 4872 739.3  727.4  -11.9    57976.8
Finland              32208   67.5    60.5    -7  225456
Sweden              43650 171  165.3    -5.7  248805
Norway              32065               146.5  141.4    -5.1 163531.5
Switzerland 1189               806.9  783 -23.9   28417.1
Czech 2656 585 572.8 -12.2  32403.2
Estonia 1891   51   46.6   -4.4    8320.4
Hungary 1670 65.5   64.4    -1.1    1837
Poland 6372             689 676.7 -12.3  78375.6
Slovenia   906             436.9 428.3   -8.6    7791.6
Appendix: Equation Listing for CGE model GRANFA4.
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LDEQUAZ: Labour demand in value added for industry n  in country I as a CES function of the wage
relative to cost of value added
()
in
i n i n i n i n i W PVA VA L
2
, , , , / . . 2
s d =
KDEQUAZ: Capital demand in value added as a CES function of the (fixed international) cost of
capital relative to cost of value added
() ( )
in R PVA VA K n i n i n i n i
2
, , , , / . . 2 1
s d - =
PVAEQUAZ: Unit cost of value added calculated as total cost divided by value added.
( ) n i n i i n i n i VA R K W L PVA , , , , / . . + =
VAEQUAZ: Demand for value added related with a CES function to total demand for industry n in
country i’s output and the price of value added relative to average production cost
()
in top
n i n i n i n i n i PVA PG YQ VA
s a , , , , , / . . =26
CENEQUAZ: Demand for energy products related with a CES function to total energy demand in the
industry and the relative price of the fuel to aggregate energy.
()
in en
en n i n i n i en n i en n i PCIT PEN VEN en CIT
s d , , , . , , , , , / . =
PENEQUAZ: Average price of energy inputs to industry n in country I, calculated as average cost.
n i en n i
n e
en n i n i VEN PCIT CIT PEN , , ,
,
, , , / ) . (å =
VENEQUAZ: Total energy input into industry n in country I, related by a CES function to the output
price of n and the price of the aggregate energy input.
()
n i top
n i n i n i n i n i PEN PG YQ en VEN
,
, , , , , / . .
s a =
CMAEQUAZ: Shares of each non-energy material in aggregate input of non-energy materials into
industry n in country I, related by a CES function to aggregate non-energy material input and the price
of the particular input relative to the aggregate input.
()
n i mat
ma n i n i n i ma n i ma n i PCIT PMA VMA ma CIT
,
, , , , , , , , / . .
s d =
PMAEQUAZ: Price or average cost of non-energy materials inputs into industry n in country i.
n i
ma







MAEQUAZ: Demand by industry n in country I for aggregate non-energy materials, related by  a
CES function to total output of industry n in I and relative prices
()
n i top
n i n i n i n i n i PMA PG YQ ma VMA
,
, , , . , , / .
s a =
PGEQUAZ: Average unit production cost of n in country I, calculated by average cost of inputs per
unit output, less the URBT rebate (only for scenarios where carbon tax expenditure is rebated to the
industry) and grossed up/down by the production tax/subsidy
( )( ) n i n i n i n i n i n i n i n i n i n i n i YQ TP URBT VEN PMA VMA PEN VEN PVA VA PG , , , , , , , , , , , / 1 . . . . . + - + + =
CIX1EQUAZ: Demand in country I for home-produced inputs of n by industry nn, related by a CES
function to total inputs of n into nn and relative prices including specific tax.
() ()
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CIX1BEQUAZ: Demand for composite imports of nn into industry n in country I as a CES function of
total inputs of nn and relative prices.
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CIX2EQUAZ: Demand for imported intermediate inputs of nn from country ii into industry n in
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* CONSUMER SIDE \
* \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
MDEF: Full disposable income including net-of tax income from capital owned and valuation of the
the full endowment of labour plus leisure, plus various transfers.
() ( )
å + + +
- + =
ii
i ii i i i i
i i i i i
GRANTRAN PUT TRANSFER INCTAXR ALLOW
INCTAXR EB W KSB R INC
, 2 . .
1 . . .
LLEQUAZ: Demand for leisure time as a CES function of real full disposable income and the real
wage net of tax.
()( ) ()
i
i i i i i i i INCTAXR W PUT PUT INC L LEIS
d
g - = 1 1 . 1 / . .
UT2EQUAZ: Utility from consumption in i.
() () i i i i i i PUT INCTAXR W LEIS INC UT 2 / 1 . 2 . - - =
PUT1EQUAZ: Cost of utility function including utility from leisure as a CES function of the net-of tax
wage (= opportunity cost of leisure) and price index for the consumption bundle.
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XD1EQUAZ: Final consumer commodity demand for good nn in country I, as a CES function of total
consumer expenditure and relative prices.
()
i
nn i i i nn i nn i PXD PUT UT XD
1
, . . , , 1 / 2 2 1 1
s g =
PUT2EQUAZ: Price of aggregate consumer bundle, calculated as average cost.
å =
nn
i nn i nn i UT PXD XD i PUT 2 / 1 . 1 2 , ,
;
XD2EQUAZ: Final consumer demand for home-produced good nn in country I, as a CES function of
total final consumer demand for n in I and relative prices.
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XD2BEQUAZ: Final consumer demand in country I for aggregate imported commodity nn, as a CES
function of total final consumer demand for nn in I and relative prices.
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PXD1EQUAZ: Price index for final consumer demand for nn in I, calculated as average cost.28
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XD3EQUAZ: Final consumer demand for imports of nn from country ii into country I, as a CES
function of aggregate imports of nn into I for final consumption and relative prices, including taxes.
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*  MARKET CLEARING EQUATIONS \ *
* \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
EXMKTG: Market clearing in the goods market for good nn in country i.
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GOVBUDGET: Equation balancing the government budget. Income tax revenue plus
import tariff revenue on consumer goods, plus VAT on imported consumer goods, plus
VAT on home-produced consumer goods, plus specific taxes on imported inputs, plus
specific taxes on home-produced inputs, plus tariffs on imported inputs, plus production
taxes, minus various transfers equals zero (there is no direct government spending on





0 . 2 .
1 / . .
. . 2
. 1
, , , . , , , 2
. 3 . 2
1 . . . 2




, , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , ,
, , , , , ,
, , , , ,































n i n i
ii
ii i i i
n
n i n i n i n i
nn n i ii
n i nn ii nn ii ii nn n i
nn n
n i nn i nn n i
ni ii
nn i ii
nn ii i ii nn i nn i i nn i
nn
i nn i nn i nn i
nn i ii
i nn i nn ii i nn ii ii nn i
nn i ii
nn ii i nn ii ii nn i
i i i i i i
VEN URBT GRANTRAN PUT TRANSFER
TP TP PG YQ
TTARPB PG CIX
SPTAX CIX
n i nn SPTAXii ii nn n i CIX
SPCTAX XD SPCTAX XD
TT TT PG XD
TT TT TAR PG XD
TAR PG XD
ALLOW LEIS EB W KSB R INCTAXR29
EXMKTL: Total labour employed equals labour endowment less leisure.
() () 0 , = - - å i i
n
n i LEIS EB LD
Listing of Variables in the model:
Production Side:
CITi,n,en               Inputs of energy type en into industry n in country i.
CITi,n,ma              Inputs of non-energy material type ma into industry n in country i.
CIX1i,n,nn            Input of home-produced nn into industry n in country i.
CIX1B i,n,nn         Demand for composite imports of nn into n in country i.
CIX2i,n,nn,ii           Input of nn from country ii into n in country i.
Ki,n                                 Capital employed in industry n in country i.
Li,n                                  Labour employed in industry n in country i.
PCITi,n,en             Price of energy type en into industry n in country i.
PCITi,n,ma            Price of non-energy material type ma into n in country i.
PCIX1Bi,n,nn        Price of composite import of nn into n in country i.
PENi,n                 Price of aggregate energy input into industry n in country i.
PGi,n                   Unit cost of output of industry n in country i.
PMAi,n                Price of aggregate non-energy materials input into industry n in i.
PVAi,n                 Unit cost of value added of industry n in country i.
R                         Unit cost of capital worldwide.
VAi,n                   Value added of industry n in country i.
VENi,n                Aggregate energy input into industry n in country i.
VMAi,n               Aggregate input of non-energy materials into industry n in country i.
Wi                      Wage in country i.
YQi,n                  Gross output of industry n in country i.
Consumer Side.
INCi                   Full disposable income in country i.
INCTAXRi        Income tax rate in country I (fixed for most scenarios).
LEISi                  Time devoted to leisure rather than labour.
PUT1i                 Price index for utility (including leisure) in country i.
PUT2i                 Price index for aggregate consumption in country i.
PXD1i,nn            Price index for consumption of nn in i.
PXD2Bi,nn        Price index for aggregate import bundle of nn for final consumers in i.
TRANSFERi     Lump-sum transfer from government to consumers in country I (fixed
                           for most scenarios.
TT1i                  Scalar to adjust all VAT rates in country i to give desired revenue.
UT2i                   Utility from consumption (excluding leisure) in country i.
XD1i,nn              Final consumer demand for good nn in country i.
XD2i,nn             Final consumer demand for home-produced good nn in country i.
XD2Bi,nn          Demand for aggregate bundle of imports of nn for final consumers in i.




SPTAXii,nn,i,n    Specific tax on inputs of nn from ii into production of n in i.
TPi,n                  Production tax on production of n in i.
TTARPBii,nn,i,n  Import tariff on inputs of nn from ii into n in i.
URBTi,n             Rebate of carbon tax expenditure by industry n in I (for permit
allocation study only).
ai,n                     Share parameter for value added in total output.
aCIXi,n,nn,i         Share parameter for home-produced n in total inputs into n in i.
aCIX2i,n,nn,ii        Share parameter for imports of n from ii in total imported inputs into
n in i.
aeni,n                  Share parameter for energy in total inputs into n in i.
aman                  Share parameter for non-energy materials in total inputs into n in i.
d2i,n                    Share parameter for labour in value added
deni,n,en                        Share of fuel en in total energy use in industry n in i.
mii,n,nn,i                 Initial ratio of price of  nn from ii used by n in I including tax to
pre-tax price.
mHi,n,nn               Initial ratio of price of home-produced nn used by n in I including tax
to           pre-tax price.
mMi,n,nn               Initial ratio of price of composite import of nn used by n in I
including tax to pre-tax price.
s2i,n                     Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital.
s3i,n,nn                 Elasticity of substitution between home-produced and imported nn in
inputs into n in country i.
seni,n                   Elasticity of substitution between fuels in production of n in i.
smati,n                  Elasticity of substitution between non-energy materials in
production.
stopi,n                  Elasticity of substitution between value added, energy and materials.
Consumer Side.
ALLOWi             Income tax allowance.
EBi                     Labour endowment in country i.
GRANTRANi,ii   Lump-sum transfers of windfall profits to shareholders in ii due to
grandfathering of permits in country i.
SPCTAXi,ii,nn      Specific tax on consumption of nn from ii in country i.
TARi,ii,nn                Tariff on imports of nn from ii for final consumption in i.
TTi,nn                  Basic VAT rate (before adjustment to make government balance) on
nn in i.
                                                       
3 In this type of modelling, a parameter is of fixed value, and does not vary
endogenously as the model is solved, unlike a variable.31
gCi                       Share parameter for labour in labour endowment in country i.
gLi                       Share parameter for leisure in labour endowment in country i.
g1i,nn                             Share parameter for good nn in final consumption in country i.
g2i,nn,i                           Share parameter for home-produced good nn in final consumption in
country i.
g2Bi,nn,i                           Share parameter for aggregate imported good nn in final
consumption in country i.
g3i,nn,i                              Share parameter for imports of good nn from ii in aggregate imports
of nn in country i.
di                        Elasticity of substitution between labour and leisure in country i.
s1i                      Elasticity of substitution between different goods in final
consumption in i.
s2i,nn                 Elasticity of substitution between home-produced and imported good
in final consumption in i.
s3i,nn                 Elasticity of substitution between imports from different countries in
final consumption of nn in i.32
Bibliography.
Alcamo, J., Shaw, R.W. and Hordijk, L. (1990) ‘The RAINS model of Acidification,
Science and Strategies in Europe’. Kluwer, Doordrecht. IIASA reference BK-90-903.
Barker, T. and Kohler, J. (1998): ‘Equity and ecotax reform in the EU: achieving a 10
per cent reduction in CO2 emissions using excise duties’, Fiscal Studies, 19, 4, 375-402.
Bertok, I., Cofala, J., Klimont, Z., Schoepp, W. and Amann, M.(1993), ‘Structure of the
RAINS 7.0 Energy and Emissions database’. IIASA working paper WP-93-67.
Laxenburg, Austria.
Boehringer, C., (1998) ‘Unilateral Taxation of International Environmental
Externalities and Sectoral Exemptions’, in Fossati, A. and Hutton, J.P. (Eds), Policy
Simulations in the European Union,  Routledge, Andover, U.K.
Boehringer, C., Pahlke, A., and Rutherford, T. (1998): ‘Environmental Tax Reforms
and the Prospects for a Double Dividend: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium
Analysis for Germany’. Mimeo, University of Colorado, Boulder.
Boehringer, C., Rutherford, T. and Voss, A. (1998): ‘Global CO2 emissions and
unilateral action: policy implications of induced trade effects’
International Journal of Global Energy Issues, 11 (1-4), 1998, pp33
18-22.
Bovenberg, A.L. and De Moji, R.A. (1994): ‘Environmental Levies and Distortionary
Taxes’. The American Economic Review, 1994.
Clarke, R., Boero, G., and Winters, L.A.(1996), ‘Controlling Greenhouse Gases: a
survey of global macroeconomic studies’. Bulletin of Economic Research, 48 (4): 269-
308.
Clarke, R., and Edwards, T.H.(1997): ‘The Welfare Effects of Removing the West
German Hard Coal Subsidy’. University of Birmingham Dept of Economics Discussion
Paper  97-23.
Clarke,R., and Edwards, T.H. (1998): ‘Deregulation of the Japanese Oil Products
Market’.  Energy Policy, Vol 26 no 2 pp 129-141. Elsevier, UK.
Conrad, K., and Schmidt, T.F.N. (1998): ‘Double Dividend of Climate Protection and
the Role of International Policy Coordination in the EU - an Applied General
Equilibrium Analysis with the GEM-E3 Model’. Discussion Paper No 97-26, ZEW
Centre for European Economic research, Mannheim.
Duncan, A., Hutton, J.P., Laroui, F. and Ruocco, A. (1998): ‘The labour market effects
of VAT harmonisation in a multicountry AGE model’. In Fossati, A., and Hutton, J.P.
op cit.34
Edwards, T.H. (1998): ‘Modelling the Effects of Energy Market Distortions on the
Costs of Carbon Abatement: Computable general equilibrium and partial equilibrium
assessment’. In Fossati, A. and Hutton, J.P.(Eds) Policy Simulations in the European
Union, Routledge, Andover, U.K.
Fehr, H. (1996):‘Construction of a Microconsistent Data Set for the EU 1992’. Mimeo,
University of Tuebingen, Germany.
Fehr,H., Rosenberg, C., and Wiegard, W. (1995): Welfare Effects of Value-Added Tax
Harmonisation in Europe. Springer.
Hutton, J.P. and Ruocco, A. (1999): ‘Tax Reform and Employment in Europe’,
International Tax and Public Finance, forthcoming, 1999.
International Energy Agency (1993): Energy Statistics of OECD Countries,
OECD/IEA, Paris.
International Energy Agency (1998 q 3): Energy Prices and Taxes. OECD.IEA, Paris.
Klaassen, G. (1996) ‘Acid Rain and Environmental Degradation. The Economics of
Emissions Trading’. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. IIASA reference BK-96-002.
ISBN 1-85898-489-0.
Markusen, J.R. (1975): ‘International externalities and optimal tax structures’, Journal
of International Economics 5, pp. 15-29.35
Marshall, Lord C. (1998): ‘Economic instruments and the business use of energy’,
report to Chancellor, HM Treasury, London.
Pench, A. (1998): ‘Ecotaxes in a CGE Model for Italy’. In Fossati, A. and Hutton, J.P.
op cit.
Ruocco, A. (1996): ‘A multi-country general equilibrium model for the European
Union: the basic features and coding structure’, Discussion Paper 83,
Wirtschaftwissenschaftlichte Facultat, University of Tubingen.
Vocke R. (1997) 'A critical note on the use of the Armington conjecture in Applied
General Equilibrium Analysis'. Istituto di Finanza working paper n.8/97. Genoa, Italy.
Whalley, J. and Wigle, R. (1991): The International Incidence of Carbon taxes’ in
Dornbusch, R. and Poterba, J.M. (eds), Global Warming: Economic Policy Responses.
MIT press, London.
World Bank (1992): World Development Report 1992, OUP, New York, USA.